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IN THE SUPREME COURT

FOSTER LEONARD,
Peti t:i one]::: ,

Supreme Court
Case No.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 900560-CA

v.
STATE OP UTAH,

Priority No. 13
Respondent.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the lower courts erred in characterizing as a mere
"level-two stop" an initial police-citizen encounter in which the
defendant's car was pulled over by three patrol cars carrying four
police officers, at least three of whom got out of the cars and
converged upon the defendant and his woman passenger; where it was
"very possible" that the officers had their guns drawn, even though
there was no evidence that the defendant or his passenger—who were
then suspected of traffic violations and a possible purchase of
drug equipment or precursor chemicals—were armed or dangerous, and
the defendant voluntarily exited the car and walked towards the
officers in a cooperative, non-violent manner; where the stop was
made on a well-traveled freeway during daylight hours; where the
defendant was forced to kneel by the side of the freeway with his
hands in front of him; where the defendant's passenger was placed
in one of the patrol cars for questioning; and where the defendant
and his passenger were advised of their Miranda rights before being
questioned.
2.
Whether the state met its burden of showing that the
initial stop of the defendant was sufficiently justified and
limited to satisfy the conditions of a "level-two stop,11
Whether the defendant's rights under the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah were violated because probable
cause was lacking for a de facto arrest.

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' opinion and order denying rehearing are
found in Appendix 1 to this petition.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
On December 5, 1991, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion
affirming the defendant's conviction.
Utah Adv. Rep. 49

See, State v. Leonard, 175

(Utah App. 1991) .

Counsel for the State

nevertheless filed a Petition for Rehearing on December 18, 1991.
The Court of Appeals denied the State's Petition on January 9,
1992.
Mr. Leonard retained new counsel and filed a timely motion for
an extension of time until March 11, 1992, in which to file a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The motion for an extension was

granted by order dated February 11, 1992. Thus, this petition is
timely under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 48(a) & (e) .
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (Supp. 1990).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The full text of the following provisions is contained in
Appendix 3 to this petition:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 14
2

Utah Code Ann- § 77-7-2 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Proceedings below
Mr. Leonard was arraigned on drug-related charges in the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County.

He filed a motion

to suppress evidence obtained from searches of his residence and
the car he was driving.

Judge George E. Bailiff conducted a

hearing on the motion on August 29, 1989, and denied the motion in
a Ruling dated October 19, 1989.

(See, Appendix 2.)

Mr. Leonard then entered a conditional plea of guilty to a
charge of possessing

equipment with

intent to manufacture a

controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37C-8
(1990) and a charge of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990).

(R.

44, 51, 65, 108-121, 151-158.) A final judgment of conviction was
entered, and he was sentenced to not more than five years in prison
and a $1,000 fine on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
(R. 187.)
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Leonard contended
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
argued that:

He

(1) his arrest was not based upon probable cause; (2)

the search of the vehicle he was driving was not based on probable
3

cause; and (3) the search of his residence was tainted by the
illegality of the arrest. See, State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 at 3.
The first argument was directed not so much at the legality of
the officers1 conduct when they later placed the defendant formally
under arrest, but at the legality of the initial stop or seizure.
On this issue, the appellate judges were in sharp disagreement.
Judge Norman H. Jackson concluded "that there was an articulable
suspicion which justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that
therefore the level two seizure of defendant was reasonable." Id.
at 6.
Judge Gregory K. Orme agreed that the officers had the
requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two stop.
However,

"[g]iven

the

intrusive

tactics

employed

by

the

investigating officers," he believed the initial seizure was a "de
facto arrest requiring probable cause."

Id. at 16 (J. Orme,

dissenting).
Judge Leonard H. Russon believed "probable cause to arrest
Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped Leonard's
vehicle." Id. at 15-16 (J. Russon, concurring). But as Judge Orme
emphasized, the State itself did not "contend that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything more
intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions."
Id. at 16 (J. Orme, dissenting).
4

B.

Facts
The trial court's Ruling contains the following findings

fact pertinent to the initial stop:
(1)
From approximately May 1, 1989, law enforcement
agencies had been conducting surveillance at Intertech
Chemical in Orem, Utah. The surveillance has resulted in
a number of arrests and convictions.
(2) On July 20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed defendant Leonard
in the parking lot wearing casual clothes and using what
appeared to be a personal vehicle rather than a company
vehicle.
(3) Leonard behaved in a nervous manner. He purchased
what looked to the detective to be glassware and
chemicals and appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle and left
the parking lot.
(4) Detective Fox decided to follow the vehicle in order
to identify its owner. As Fox attempted to follow the
vehicle, another car swerved in front of Fox in an
apparent attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared to
Fox that the defendants' vehicle was trying to evade
pursuit. Fox noted reckless behavior on the part of the
defendants as they turned to get on the freeway that
nearly caused an accident.
On the freeway, the
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per hour in a 55
miles per hour zone.
(5)
Detective Fox called for back up after a check
through dispatch found no owner registered for either the
plates of the defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle
that swerved in front of him. The vehicle was stopped
without incident after the backup arrived. . . .
(6) The Court finds that the stop made by the officers
was appropriate and legal. Detective Fox had reasonable
suspicion based on the circumstances taken as a whole.
The defendants did not appear to be ordinary businessmen;
they appeared to be nervous; they drove erratically; they
used what appeared to be a personal vehicle; another car

5

seemed to be acting in concert with defendants in an
attempt to block the detective's pursuit; dispatch could
not identify [the] owner of the vehicle from the license
plate number; the defendants were traveling more than 15
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit; the list of
items purchased given to the officers while in pursuit
were indicative of illegal activity.
All of these
factors taken together could easily create a reasonable
and articul[able] suspicion necessary to make an
investigatory stop
(7)
Even before the officers began investigatory
questioning which does not require it, defendants were
given Miranda warnings.
(Ruling at 1-4, Appendix 2.)
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Leonard did not
dispute

the

underlying

facts

so

much

as

the

subjective

interpretations placed on those facts and the trial

court's

ultimate findings that the officers had the requisite justification
for their conduct.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion summarizes the pertinent facts
in a section called "Background."

Of these facts, as the Opinion

correctly notes, "only facts known to the officers at the time they
stopped defendant's vehicle are relevant" to the validity of the
initial stop (Opinion at 6, n.3; emphasis in original). See, State
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988).
The following facts are also relevant and appear in the
record:

6

1. What the officers knew
Mr. Leonard's conduct at Intertech was observed by Officer
Fox, who testified as follows:
[The defendant and Ms. Garza] entered the business. They
were driving a silver and blue Ford Bronco. When they
entered the business, I noticed that they weren't dressed
as typical businessmen, meaning Levis and Polo shirt.
When they walked in the business I saw the male defendant
here, Mr. Leonard, walk to the doorway, stand there in
the doorway smoking a cigarette, keep pacing around,
looking around as if scanning the parking lot area . . .
As he scanned around, he finished his cigarette.
I saw a female employee inside the business . . . set out
cartons or containers. These cartons or containers had
pictures on them in blue and black consistent with
glassware boxes. They had pictures of flasks on them.
I saw her set out gallon containers, some type of
chemical. I couldn't tell what it was at that time.
And then I saw Mr. Leonard continue to come to the
doorway, look around. . . .
Mr. Leonard continued to do what appeared to be
surveillance. He lifted up his front shirt and appeared
to be doing something down the front of his pants here,
and then looked like to me he took a wallet from his
pants . . .
As he looked around, pretty soon these chemicals were
loaded by the front doorway by the employees of
Intertech. Mr. Leonard came out and got into this Bronco
and drove it over by the front door. And he and Miss
Garza loaded these chemicals into the back of the Bronco
They both got into the Bronco and proceeded to leave the
business.
(T. 10-13.)
Officer Fox thought the suspicious thing about Mr. Leonard and
7

Ms. Garzafs conduct was
30.)

lf

[j]ust the items being taken out."

(T.

It was Mr. Leonard's appearance at a store that was under

surveillance—not looking like a "legitimate businessman"— that
aroused

the

officer's

suspicion.

He

thought

a

"legitimate

businessman" would instead "show up with something identifying his
company, would look presentable, wouldn't scan the parking lot,
reach down the front of his pants, wouldn't appear to be so
nervous.

Those type of things."

(T. 28-29.)

Officer Fox followed the Bronco for some time in his unmarked
police car, all the way from Orem to approximately SR 92, north of
Lehi.

(T. 18, 37 & 52.)

During this time, he observed several

moving violations by Mr. Leonard: a failure to yield the right of
way when turning left, two lane changes without signaling, and
traveling about 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile zone.
18.)

(T. 14, 16 &

Officer Fox thought these violations "bordered on reckless

driving."

(T. 35.)

When Officer Fox ran a registration check on the Bronco,
dispatch reported that the plates on the vehicle were not on file.
(T. 15.)

(It was later found, as Mr. Leonard told the officers at

the time of the initial stop, that the Bronco was registered to his
passenger, Ms. Garza.

T. 43 & 67.)

"[M]aybe 20 seconds prior to the stop," Officer Caldwell
called Intertech to inquire what items had just been sold.
34 & 43).

(T. 33-

The officer.s determined that "[n]othing that they
8

purchased was illegal or regulated"—ff[i]t was a legal purchase."
(T. 34-35)•

2.

What the officers did
We now turn to the facts showing the intrusiveness of the

encounter. As Judge Orme notes, "[l]ittle attention seems to have
been given at the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in
effecting the stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to
effect the stop."

(Dissenting opinion, n.5.)

However, the

transcript of the hearing shows the following facts about the
officersf conduct:
Officer Fox called for back-up because "the past people we
have dealt with have been felons, had extensive criminal histories
—some of them for homicide—have been escapees from prison and
were armed in these type of stops, I was concerned for my safety."
(T. 17.)

"The flags coming out the side windows1 was very unique,

strange to me, and it kind of frightened me.
call for backup and assistance."

So I continued to

Id.

Two additional vehicles responded to the call.

The vehicle

that first approached the Bronco to make the stop carried two
officers, Blackhurst and Caldwell.
Officer Greening.

In the second vehicle .was

Officer Fox followed in a third vehicle.

1

(T.

Apparently the "flags" were tied to the Bronco's seat belts
and went up when the seat belts were fastened. (See, T. 37.)
9

18.)

Thus, a total of four officers from three police cars

effected the stop.

(T. 33-34 & 38.)

When the cars stopped, Officer Fox stepped out and joined
Officers Caldwell and Blackhurst by the first car.

(T. 19.)

Officer Greening also exited his patrol vehicle and "maintained a
secure position" there.

(T. 52.) In the meantime, Mr. Leonard got

out of the Bronco and started walking back towards them.

Id.

He

identified himself and answered the officers' questions about the
registration.2

(T. 67.)

Officer Fox ordered Mr. Leonard to kneel down "so I could
watch his hands and he wouldn't flee from me."

(T. 19.)

Then the

officer ordered Ms. Garza to get out of the vehicle and to come
back and kneel down as well.

Id.

They were kneeling in the

emergency lane, on the north side of Lehi on 1-15 northbound.

(T.

18-19.)
Officer Fox did not have his gun drawn but thought it was
"very possible" that other officers did have their guns drawn. (T.
39.)

Officer Caldwell didn't have a gun but "hoped" that another

of the officers pulled a gun when they got out of the car.

(T.

90.)
Officer Caldwell took over.

He ordered Mr. Leonard to the

side of the road and advised him of his Miranda rights, then
2

At this point in time, the officers did not know whether
the information Mr. Leonard gave them was true or false.
10

started asking what they were doing.

(T. 19.)

After interviewing Mr. Leonard and Ms. Garza for approximately
15 minutes, the officers made a formal arrest and took them to the
American Fork Police Department.

(T. 20.)

REASONS WHY THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
Question 1;

Was this a "level-two stop" or a de facto arrest?

The fourth amendment to the United

States Constitution3

requires that the "seizure" of a person be supported by "probable
cause."

A limited exception to this requirement was first

recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968) . Since the brief stop in Terry was less intrusive than
an arrest, the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause
was not necessary. However, the Court said the police officer must
be able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion."

392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.4

3

The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio. 376 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, is similar in language to the fourth amendment.
(See
Appendix 3.)
4

Utah has codified the reasonable suspicion standard.
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). (See Appendix 3.)
11

Utah

This Court has explained that there are three levels of
police-citizen encounters, each of which requires a different
degree of justification to be constitutional:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against
his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or
is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987), quoting United
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).

"Any time a

police officer stops an automobile the stop necessarily involves
detention and therefore is [at least] a level two encounter . . ."
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988).
The stop in this case was even more intrusive. A level-two or
Terry stop "involves no more than a brief stop, interrogation, and,
under the proper circumstances, a brief check for weapons." United
States v. Robertson> 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1987).

Anything

beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined intrusion constitutes a de
facto arrest, and probable cause is required.

See id.; Dunaway v.

New York. 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979).
As this Court held in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763
(Utah 1991) , the "length and scope of the detention must be
12

'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible.111

For a stop to be "constitutionally

permissible upon less than probable cause, it must be appropriately
limited as to length and the investigative techniques employed."
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2(f) (2d Ed. 1987 & Supp.
1992) (emphasis added).
In Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319) (1983), the
purported Terry stop of a suspect at an airport lasted only 15
minutes,

but

the

four-Justice

plurality

insufficiently limited—an illegal arrest.

found

it

to

be

"[A] Terry stop can

become an arrest (& consequently an illegal one if probable cause
is not then present) if it now appears that the police could have
utilized some other means of investigation which it is believed
would have been less intrusive."

LaFave, supra, § 9.2(f).

If the show of force and detention used in the context of a
purported Terry stop are "indistinguishable from police conduct in
an arrest," the seizure is invalid.

United States v. Delaadillo-

Velasguez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988) (Terry stop of
suspected drug dealers was invalid where police approached with
guns drawn, ordered the suspects to lie down in the street, and
handcuffed them).

Thus, police may not, as a matter of routine,

utilize methods in the course of a valid Terry stop which might
commonly be employed incident to arrest.
at 366.
13

LaFave, supraf § 9.2(d)

The methods used by the officers in this case are commonly
employed in an arrest:

ordering a suspect to kneel, confining a

suspect in the patrol car for interrogation, and informing the
suspect of Miranda rights.
There was also an unusual showing of force and authority.
Three officers and four patrol cars effected the arrest of Mr.
Leonard and his sole passenger, a young woman.
guns were drawn on them.

It is likely that

The present case is an example of those

"circumstances in which the police presence is so overpowering as
to be 'inconsistent with a brief Terry-type stop 'to determine [the
defendant's] identification or to maintain a status quo.'"

See

LaFave, supra, § 9.2(d) (Supp. 1992); Commonwealth v. Sanderson,
398 Mass. 761, 500 N.E.2d 1337 (1986) (deeming assemblage of six
officers and a police dog an arrest rather than a Terry stop).
Of course, police may use force or other exceptional methods
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary for
their safety and protection.

But even then, the officers must

employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the
purpose of the stop.

See, Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1325.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case conflicts with its
earlier pronouncement that:
A person is under arrest for fourth amendment purposes
when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave.

14

State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (1981), quoting Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S.Ct. at 1326-27. Federal courts have
also held that a level-two stop evolves into a level-three arrest
when, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable, innocent
person in the suspect's place would believe himself to be under
arrest.

See, United States v. Pinion, 800 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir.

1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.Ct. 1580 (1987).
As Judge Orme pointed out, a reasonable, innocent person in
Mr. Leonard's place would have believed himself to be under arrest:
The police converged on defendant in three separate cars.
The initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite
defendant's passivity, and may well have included a show
of weapons by one or more officers.
Defendant was
ordered to his knees at the side of the highway, while
his female companion was placed in the back of a police
vehicle.
Defendant was then informed of his Miranda
rights.
It is unlikely that, at this point in the
encounter, a reasonable person in defendant's position
would believe his seizure to be less than a level-three
custodial one.
State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 (J. Orme, dissenting, n. 6) (emphasis
added).
09

See also, Kraus v. County of Pierce. 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-

(9th Cir. 1986)

(where officers turned spotlights on the

defendant, drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to
their knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself under
arrest).

Question 2;

Did the State meet its burden of proof?

The State did not provide additional evidence that would
15

justify the intrusive methods used by the police in this encounter.
"The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt to
discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests that,
once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the officers
did not suspect he was armed."
Orme, dissenting, n.4).

State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 (J.

"Other circumstances of the stop—the

highway locale, the presence of four officers, the non-violent
nature of the suspected offense, and defendant's
attempt

to

approach

the

police

vehicles—also

non-furtive

indicate

the

situation was not potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics
were inappropriate."

Id.

The State has the burden to show that a seizure it seeks to
justify was limited to the conditions of a level-two stop.

See,

State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) (reviewing on writ of
certiorari an officer's basis for the level-two stop of a motor
vehicle and finding that the extent of intrusion on the passenger
was not justified); United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894
(9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255
(1986); United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir.
1983), quoting Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26.
The State failed to meet its burden in this case. See, State
v. Leonard, (J. Orme, dissenting, n.5). Therefore, the denial of
Mr. Leonard's suppression motion should have been reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to permit
16

withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Question 3;

Was probable cause lacking?

Even when considered in their totality, the facts of record
which were known to the officers at the time of the initial stop
would not amount to the "probable cause" necessary for an encounter
more intrusive than a level-two stop.
In a prior decision, the Court of Appeals has explained that:
Although the government may present a lengthy list of
detailed observations, the courts are not relieved of
their duty to review the list critically and decide
whether each particular observation cited actually
contributes something to the "whole picture"—that is,
whether the particular observation bears any reasonable
correlation to a suspicion that the person presently is
engaged in criminal activity.
State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 944 (Utah App. 1988), quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d

1413, 1418

(9th Cir. 1987).

A

fortiori, a list of factors said to support a finding of probable
cause must be reviewed critically.
The trial court's first finding was that Intertech was under
surveillance, resulting in a number of arrests and convictions.
However, the Court of Appeals had previously declared that "an
area's reputation for criminal activity should not be imputed to an
individual."

State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989).

Officer Fox's observations of Mr. Leonard at Intertech have
little bearing.

"Scanning or "looking around" is not such unusual

17

behavior that it would support a finding of reasonable suspicion,
much less "probable cause."

See, Sery, 758 P.2d at 944. Wearing

Levis and a Polo shirt is not suggestive of criminal activity. Nor
is driving a personal rather than a company car.
The Court of Appeals had pointed out in an earlier case that
"nervousness" is a highly subjective characteristic. "An officer's
mere conclusion regarding defendant's nervousness, unsupported by
relevant objective facts, can have no weight in determining if he
had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."

Sery, 758 P.2d

at 944-45.
The State never showed that the occupants of the Datsun that
swerved in front of Officer Fox had any connection to Mr. Leonard.
The list of purchased items which Intertech gave to the
officers while they were in pursuit, was not necessarily indicative
of illegal activity. The list showed that glassware and chemicals,
whose purchase was not illegal or regulated but could be used in
the manufacture of a controlled substance, had been purchased.
Finally, the problem of an apparent lack of registration for
the Bronco should have been quickly dispelled with the information
that it was registered in the name of the passenger, Ms. Garza.
The lack of a registration certificate and the fact that the
occupants did not own the car did not rise even to the level of an
articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, in State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
18

Such "facts are just as

consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed
the car from its rightful owner."

Id. at 764.

"The fact that [a police officer's] 'hunch' proved correct is
perhaps a tribute to his policeman's intuition, but it is not
sufficient to justify, ex post facto. a seizure that was not
objectively reasonable at its inception."

State v. Sierra, 754

P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988).

CONCLUSION
The controversial nature of this case, and the need for
guidance to state trial courts and police officers, is reflected in
the three divergent opinions entered by the three judges of the
Utah Court of Appeals.
The main opinion did not apply the Court of Appeals' own test
for the occurrence of an arrest, a test which is also applied by
federal courts. The Court did not hold the State to its burden of
justifying the extent of the officers' intrusion, nor did it follow
its own advice to review the list of the officers' observations
critically.
For all these reasons, Mr. Leonard asks this Court to grant a
writ of certiorari on the questions presented in his petition.
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JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Foster Leonard appeals from his conviction for
possession of equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37C-8 (1990), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (1990). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
From approximately May 1, 1989, to when the present facts
occurred, law enforcement agencies had been conducting
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem, Utah. The
surveillance had resulted in several arrests and convictions
relating to the possession and manufacture of controlled
substances, specifically methamphetamine. On July 20, 1989,
Police Officer Terry Fox was conducting surveillance at
Intertech. He noticed defendant and April Garza in the parking
lot. Both were dressed in clothing "not typical of

business[people]," and looked nervous. Defendant went into
Intertech and came out carrying a box of what appeared to be
glassware and chemicals. Defendant loaded the box into a Ford
Bronco, and drove away from the parking lot with Garza. Fox
decided to follow the vehicle in order to identify its owner.
As Fox proceeded out of the parking lot in his unmarked
vehicle, a Datsun truck swerved in front of him. Fox testified
that he thought the driver of the Datsun was trying to block him
from pursuing defendant's vehicle. Fox continued to follow
defendant, who drove recklessly onto the freeway. Defendant's
vehicle accelerated to over seventy miles per hour and made
several illegal lane changes, according to Fox. Fox also
observed cefendant putting bandanna-type flags out both windows
of the Bronco, apparently to signal the occupants of the Datsun.
Fox attempted to find out who owned the vehicle he was pursuing,
but the police dispatcher found no owner registered for the
license plates on defendant's vehicle. The Datsun similarly had
no registered owner.
Fox testified that he decided to stop defendant for the
traffic violations he had witnessed. Thinking that he might be
in danger, Fox called for assistance. Three other police
officers eventually assisted Fox in stopping defendant. One of
those, Detective Gary Caldwell, learned from Intertech that
defendant and his companion had purchased glassware and a
chemical. None of the items purchased were controlled
substances, but all were commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Caldwell testified that he made the decision to
stop the vehicle based on his belief that defendant was in
possession of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances.
When defendant's vehicle was pulled over, the officers had
defendant and Garza get out of the vehicle and kneel down on the
side of the freeway. Under Caldwell's direction, Officer Sean
Greening placed Garza in his vehicle and asked her name, address,
and birthdate. Garza produced an Oregon driver's license.
Greening testified that he also advised Garza she did not have to
answer his questions. Garza asked why she was being stopped, to
which Greening replied "for possession of drug paraphernalia.11
Garza then explained to Greening that someone had paid her and
defendant to purchase the items, and that they were to deliver
the items to a motel room.
Meanwhile, Caldwell asked defendant for a driver's license
and vehicle registration. Defendant had no identification and
told Caldwell the vehicle belonged to Garza. Defendant then gave
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Caldwell the name "Scott Leonard" and a birthdate which was later
determined to be false. Caldwell testified he advised defendant
of his constitutional rights and defendant consented to answering
some questions. Caldwell then proceeded to question defendant as
to what he was doing in Utah County. Defendant told Caldwell
that he had come to Utah County to purchase the items for
someone, and that he could not tell Caldwell who that was,
because defendant would get in trouble. Caldwell also testified
that he could see a box in the back of the Bronco, and that the
box contained the items Intertech had told him defendant had
purchased.
Because the stories given by defendant and Garza were
different, and because he knew what items defendant had purchased
at Intertech, Caldwell arrested defendant and Garza. Defendant
and Garza were transported to the American Fork Police Department
and both were questioned by Caldwell. Eventually Caldwell
determined the exact address of the apartment which defendant and
Garza shared, and a search warrant of the premises was obtained,
based on Caldwell's affidavit.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the
warrantless search of the Bronco and in the warrant search of his
apartment, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause
to initiate the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied his
motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty
pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,
938 (Utah App. 1988), and this appeal followed.
Before this court, defendant appeals the denial of his
motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence was illegally
obtained. Specifically, defendant claims that his arrest was not
based on probable cause; that the search of the Bronco was not
based on probable cause; and that the search of his residence was
tainted by the illegality of the arrest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of findings of fact underlying a trial court's
decision on a motion to suppress is governed by the "clearly
erroneous" standard, State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 133 (Utah
App. 1991), because the trial court is in an advantageous
position to determine the factual basis underlying such a motion,
"The trial court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is
against the clear weight of the evidence . . . .,f State v. Serv,
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988).
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LEGALITY OF THE INITIAL STOP
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Requires that all seizures of an individual be based on probable
cause.1 The United States Supreme Court first explicitly
permitted a seizure of an individual upon less than probable
cause in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The
Terry Court held that a police officer must be able to point to
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable
suspicion standard is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
"Stressing that each case must be decided upon its own facts, the
Terry court concluded that the limited stop and frisk was
justified where ya police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his [or her]
experience that criminal activity is afoot . . . .'" State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884). Thus, a temporary detention or
seizure is justified when there is an articulable suspicion that

1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, with our emphasis:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See
id. (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct.
1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion)). This court has further
refined the Terry reasonable suspicion test, concluding that a
''brief investigatory stop must be based on * objective facts' that
the * individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v.
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
The State argues that several facts support the conclusion
that the officers in the present case had a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot, and that therefore the stop of
defendant was justified. Intertech had been under surveillance
for selling drug paraphernalia; defendant's behavior was
suspiciously inconsistent with that of a legitimate businessman;
defendant purchased several items from Intertech which are
commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine; defendant
2.
Of course, no suspicion is required when a police officer
merely makes an inquiry of an individual in the context of a
wholly voluntary encounter. The Utah Supreme Court has
determined that there are three levels of police-citizen
encounters, each of which requires a different degree of
justification to be constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.
1984)). "The stopping of a vehicle and the consequent detention
of its occupants constitute a level two xseizure' within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, even if the purpose of the stop
is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. Steward,
806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988)). In our case, it is not disputed
that a level two stop occurred.
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left Intertech in an unregistered vehicle; some person in a
Datsun tried to prevent the officers from pursuing defendant;
defendant displayed bandannas from the windows of his vehicle in
an apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the Datsun; and
defendant drove erratically and illegally on the freeway,
apparently engaging in evasive tactics.3
We agree that there was an articulable suspicion which
justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that therefore the
level two seizure of defendant was reasonable.4 While defendant
contends that the officers had no evidence that a crime had been
committed, we note that the officers were not only entitled, but
probably required, to obtain more information when they
reasonably suspected a crime had been committed. See State v.
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 971,
98 S. Ct. 523 (1977); Holmes. 774 P.2d at 508. We hold,
therefore, that defendant was constitutionally stopped and
briefly detained, and that the trial court's determination that
the requisite reasonable suspicion existed was not clearly
erroneous.
ARREST OF DEFENDANT AND SEARCH OF VEHICLE
Having determined that the initial seizure of defendant was
lawful, we must determine if the subsequent arrest and search
were lawful. Defendant argues that the police officers lacked
probable cause to arrest him, or to conduct a warrantless search
of the vehicle in which he was riding. The trial court found
that the arrest of defendant was based on probable cause because
the chemicals and equipment found in the vehicle were commonly
3. The State also lists as support for the contention that the
stop of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion, several
facts which occurred after defendant had been stopped. Of
course, only facts known to the officers at the time they stopped
defendants vehicle are relevant. See State v. Baird, 7 63 P.2d
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P-2d
181, 183 (Utah 1987).
4. While Fox testified that he originally planned to stop
defendant for traffic violations, it is clear from the record that
Caldwell, who took charge of the situation once he was contacted by
Fox, stopped defendant's vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining
who defendant was, and for what purpose the glassware and chemicals
had been purchased from Intertech.
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used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and because
testimony revealed that only one specialized piece of glassware
and some chemicals were lacking to make the illegal substance.
As to the search of defendant's vehicle,5 the trial court found
that there was probable cause based on the list of items
purchased from intertech received while the officers were in
pursuit, the suspicious behavior of defendant, and "all attendant
circumstances."6 However, the court's ruling does not indicate
which exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment it was relying upon in justifying the warrantless
search.
The Arrest
As to the legality of the arrest, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(1990) provides authority for peace officers to make an arrest
with or without a warrant. Reasonable cause for arrest without a
warrant was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972): "The
determination should be made on an objective standard: whether
5. We refer to the vehicle which defendant was driving as
"defendant's vehicle," but we note that the vehicle actually
belonged to passenger Garza.
6. The State does not argue that defendant, because he was not
the owner of the vehicle, has no standing to challenge the search
of the vehicle. Therefore, we do not reach the question of
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vehicle.
Prior to State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our
supreme court never required the issue of standing to be raised
by the parties in the trial court or on appeal. "Standing is an
issue that a court can raise sua sponte at any time." State v.
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). Rather, that court reached the
issue regardless of whether or not a party had raised it. See
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State
v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978). In Schlosser,
however, the court held that standing to challenge the validity
of a search is not a jurisdictional doctrine, and, as such, that
issue is waived if not raised before the trial court by the
parties. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138-39. But see Schlosser, 791
P.2d at 1139-41 (Howe, J., dissenting) (two justices would sua
sponte raise issue of standing).
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from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect
had committed the offense." Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).
See also State v. Avalar 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The arresting officer, Caldwell, testified that he
questioned defendant regarding his presence in Utah County and
the purchase from Intertech. Only after defendant gave a false
name and birthdate, could provide no plausible explanation for
the purchase, and would not tell Caldwell who had paid him to
make the purchase, did Caldwell effectuate an arrest.
These facts, taken together with the evasive tactics engaged
in by defendant when the officers were pursuing him, the fact
that the officers knew exactly what defendant had purchased from
Intertech based on the list of items received while in pursuit,
and the fact that the items found in defendants vehicle were
commonly used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine,
warranted arresting defendant. Accordingly, we cannot say that
the trial court's finding of probable cause was an erroneous one.
The dissent takes issue with the tactics employed by the
officers in effectuating a level two stop, concluding that a de
facto arrest actually occurred. Admittedly, if defendant had
been arrested immediately upon being stopped by the officers,
probable cause would have to be established at that point, and
not after Caldwell interviewed defendant. While many courts have
addressed the issue of when a seizure occurs,7 the cases are less
clear on when an arrest occurs. The United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest. See United States v.
Sharoe. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). There
7. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred. Terry v. Ohio, 3 92
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). See also Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S. Ct.
1758, 1763 (1984) (intimidating circumstances surrounding police
questioning result in Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)
(person is seized when, "in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave").
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is no "litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop[,] M Florida v. Rover,
460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983), and becomes an
arrest. Rather, the determination usually depends upon the
reasonableness of the stop under the circumstances. Two factors,
whether there was a proper basis for the stop, and whether the
degree of intrusion was reasonably related to the facts and
circumstances at hand, are determinative of reasonableness.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79; United States v.
Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 1097, 107 S. Ct. 1318 (1987). While the dissent does not
dispute there was a reasonable basis for the stop, it does take
issue with tactics employed by the officers. In reaching our
conclusion that a proper level two stop was effectuated in this
case, a review of cases which have addressed this question is
useful to illustrate that no arrest took place.
The dissent is correct in acknowledging one exception to the
general proscription against intrusive police conduct: police
are permitted to use a show of force or other exceptional methods
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers. The
mere use or display of force in making a stop will not
necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. United States v.
Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S.
1185, 106 S. Ct. 2923 (1986); United States v. White. 648 F.2d
29, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424
(1981). See also Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct.
1921, 1923 (1972) (police officers making a reasonable
investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to
protect themselves from possible attack); United States v. Lego,
855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer can point a gun at
suspect without transforming investigative stop into arrest);
United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.) (because
"officer suspected appellant of dealing in narcotics, a pattern
of criminal conduct rife with deadly weapons," display of weapon
justified), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3191 (1987);
United States v. Eisenbura. 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986)
(experienced police officers acted reasonably in drawing weapons
in investigative stop of suspected narcotics dealer).
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We recognize that the officers' conduct, ordering defendant
to kneel at the side of the road, was intrusive.8 If weapons
were drawn, the conduct is even more intrusive.9 Certainly such
conduct would not be warranted if the surrounding circumstances
did not give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety.
United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986).
However in this case, there was justification. While the dissent
acknowledges that certain situations merit officers approaching a
suspect with their weapons drawn, or ordering a suspect to lie on
the ground, the dissent argues that in this case, such actions
were not warranted because the police never determined whether
defendant had a weapon, and there was no indication that
defendant was dangerous. However, that conclusion is based on
faulty assumptions.

8. Focusing on whether or not requiring a driver to step out of
his or her vehicle exceeds the scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme
Court has concluded that "[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience
cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the
officer's safety." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.
Ct. 330 (1977). See also United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542,
545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer's confining suspect in police car
within scope of investigative stop); United States v. Manbeck,
744 F.2d 360, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding reasonableness of
investigative stop where police ordered the suspect to take a
seat in the police car), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S. Ct.
1197 (1985). Also, as the dissent points out, police may require
a suspect to lie on the ground. See, e.g., United States v.
Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987).
9. There is nothing in the record that supports the dissent's
conclusion that defendant was not violent or armed. In fact,
quite the opposite can be assumed given the facts recited above.
On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was reasonable to assume that a suspected narcotics dealer was
armed and dangerous. United States v. Salas. 879 F.2d 53 0, 53 5
(9th Cir.) (erratic and evasive driving by defendants and reports
of drug materials in defendants' motel room gave police
reasonable suspicion that defendants were armed), cert, denied,
493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989); see also United States v.
Post, 607 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (M[i]t is not
unreasonable to assume that a dealer in narcotics might be
armed").
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First, the record does not indicate whether or not defendant
was frisked• Two of the officers who testified gave different
accounts of what transpired after defendant's vehicle was
stopped.
Second, the record does indicate that the officers thought
defendant was dangerous and could be carrying a weapon- Officer
Fox testified that he became fearful when bandannas were put
outside the windows of defendant's car. He decided to call for
back-up officers to stop defendant's car when the bandannas
appeared, and when he saw the cream-colored Datsun following him.
"I felt it was a chase car, an assistance car," Fox testified,
"and I was again fearful that I needed to have enough help to
stop this vehicle so I wouldn't get hurt-" In addition, Fox
stated that when he sees an unregistered vehicle, he immediately
gives it more caution. Officer Greening, who also testified at
the suppression hearing, stated that he was called to assist in a
stop for drug paraphernalia, and that he has been informed in
past circumstances that "these people could be dangerous, and
thats why [he] was there to assist." Greening went on to say
that officers, including himself, were often called to assist on
DUI's and regular traffic stops, and "whenever an officer may
feel he is in danger," and that it was his belief in dealing with
people who were involved with drugs that "[t]hey have been
convicted criminals and in the possession of firearms." We find
abundant support in the record that the officers believed
defendant could be armed or dangerous, and not, as the dissent
suggests, that the police had nothing more than a hunch that
defendant might be dangerous. Therefore, the officers' actions
were not unreasonable to insure their safety.
The dissent points to defendant being read his Miranda
rights as further indication that an arrest took place. In
Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were not required when a
defendant is subjected to questioning during a routine traffic
stop. The Court pointed to the circumstances around a traffic
stop and compared them to stationhouse interrogation, "which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware
that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek." Td. at 448, 104 S. Ct. at
3149 (citations omitted). Given that traffic stops occur in
public, and that they are relatively brief, the Court concluded
that "persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S.
Ct. at 3150. The Court, however, also noted that police "could
ensure compliance with the law by giving the full Miranda
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warnings." Id. at 431 n.13, 104 S. Ct at 3145-46 n.13.10 That
is exactly what took place here.
In the present case, defendant was detained briefly on the
side of the highway. The officers interrogated defendant.
Defendant was arrested after he gave the officers false
information, and had no plausible explanation for the Intertech
purchase. Given the circumstances facing the officers, we
conclude that they pursued their investigation in a diligent and
reasonable manner, and that the methods employed were not
excessive.
The Search
Admittedly, the search of defendant's vehicle conducted
without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v.
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). The State,
acknowledging that the trial court did not rely upon a specific
exception, claims that the search was justified pursuant to the
automobile exception.
While an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
vehicle as opposed to in his or her home, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment still applies. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
390-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-70 (1985)). In Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), the Supreme Court
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was
10. in United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while officers are
not required to give Miranda warnings every time they question a
suspect, "Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop
if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning
takes place in a police dominated or compelling atmosphere-ff Id.
at 1291 (citing United States v. Wilson, 666 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170, 172 {6th Cir1979)); United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.
1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S. Ct. 778 (1976).
Compare United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988)
(police exceeded scope of investigative stop by ordering
defendant not to touch anything or say anything, and thirty-five
minutes later confined her to a small room for questioning),
cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1944 (1989).
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permissible if the officers have probable cause to believe the
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and
that they may be lost if not immediately seized. Id. at 151-52;
see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975,
1978-80 (1970); United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d 96, 100 (5th
Cir. 1983); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986);
State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); State v.
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Carroll,
267 U.S. at 132); State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 512 n.6 (Utah
App. 1989). Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully stopped
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a
warrantless search is justified where the officers have probable
cause to believe contraband is contained in the vehicle.
"The determination of whether probable cause exists . . .
depends upon an examination of all the information available to
the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they
existed at the time the search was made." State v, Dorsey, 731
P.2d at 1088 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949)). Probable cause for a
warrantless search has been found to exist on facts similar to
those in the present case. In Mendoza, drug enforcement agents
conducted surveillance of a residence, and also followed
individuals who had contact with the suspect who resided there.
The agents observed several of these individuals driving "in a
manner calculated to elude surveillance," Mendoza, 722 F.2d at
101, using pay telephones, and making several trips to and from a
warehouse. While the court said that these facts may be
consistent with innocent behavior, the totality of the
circumstances justified a warrantless search of the suspects'
vehicles. Id. at 101-02.
Similarly, in Dorsey, our supreme court upheld a warrantless
search of an automobile where a police officer who was assisting
other officers involved in an undercover narcotics purchase,
followed defendant's truck and eventually stopped him. The court
found that because the officer knew that a controlled narcotics
purchase had been attempted; that two of the individuals had left
the motel room where the negotiations were taking place; that
someone involved in the transaction had on a dark leather jacket;
and that defendant was wearing a dark leather jacket, probable
cause existed. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1089.
Reviewing all of the information available to the officers
in the present case, we hold that there was probable cause to
justify the search. Officers Caldwell and Fox both testified
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that they observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view
in the vehicle.11 The officers also testified that defendant
could not explain why he purchased the items, or for whom they
were purchased. While the officers7 information at the time of
the search might not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt,
it was sufficient to establish probable cause. See id.
Therefore, the trial court7s determination that probable cause
existed for the search was not erroneous.
VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant's last claim is that the affidavit in support of
the warrant to search his apartment contained nothing from which
a detached and neutral magistrate could conclude that the
apartment contained evidence of a crime. It is well established
that a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation" is required for the issuance of a search warrant.
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App. 1990) (citation
11. This testimony raises an interesting question in that none
of the officers testified that they actually conducted a search
of defendant's vehicle, only that they had seen the box
containing the Intertech purchase on the back seat. Although not
briefed or raised by the State, a second exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception.
Determining whether the plain view exception applies requires
application of a three-pronged test: (1) the officer7s presence
must be lawful; (2) the evidence must be in plain view; and (3)
the evidence must clearly be incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
It is clear that in the present case, the officers7 presence
was lawful. We have already established there was reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant7s vehicle. It is also clear from the
record that the box containing the glassware and chemicals was
clearly visible in the back seat of the vehicle. As for the
third prong, "clearly incriminating" has been defined as
"probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity." State v. Kelly. 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986)
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535,
1543 (1983) (plurality opinion)). In this case, there is
evidence to suggest that the contents of the box were associated
with criminal activity because all of the items purchased are
used in the manufacture of illegal substances, and are rarely
purchased in combination for any other purpose. Thus, all of the
requirements for the plain view exception are satisfied.
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omitted). In reviewing a probable cause determination, a
magistrate's decision will be upheld if "the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . [determining] that probable cause
existed." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2332 (1983)).
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the affidavit in this
case is sufficient. Taken as a whole, the affidavit establishes
that the affiant relied on his own and upon Fox's investigation
and observations of defendant's conduct; that defendant had
purchased several items which were known to be used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine; that defendant gave false
information as to where he resided, and when questioned about the
Intertech purchase; and that Garza, with whom defendant shared
the apartment, and who was arrested at the same time based upon
the same facts as defendant, had previously been convicted for
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute illegal substances. See
State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (probable
cause determination supported by fact that defendant has
previously been convicted of similar offense), cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). These facts, taken together, support the
trial court's determination that probable cause existed for the
issuance of the search warrant.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the stop and subsequent warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle, defendant's arrest, and the warrant search
of defendant's home did not violate his rights, and therefore,
the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence found as a result of those searches was not clearly
erroneous. The conviction is affirmed.

RUSSON, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but write
separately because I prefer a different analytical approach to
reach the same result. I would hold that probable cause to
arrest Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped
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Leonard's vehicle. The facts which support probable cause
include: (1) evidence that the continuing surveillance had
resulted in several arrests and convictions relating to the
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) Officer Fox's
observation that Leonard's dress and manner were suspiciously
inconsistent with those of a legimate businessman; (3) the Datsun
truck's attempt to block Officer Fox from following Leonard;
(4) Leonard's evasive driving manner, including driving at
excessive speeds and making numerous illegal lane changes;
(5) Leonard's apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the
Datsun truck by waving bandanna-type flags out the window;
(6) Officer Fox's discovery that no owner was registered for the
license plates on the vehicle that Leonard was driving; and
(7) the fact that Officer Caldwell had learned from Intertech
what items had been purchased by Leonard and his companion, in
concert with Officer Caldwell's knowledge that the said items are
commonly used in the manufacture of methampetamine. On the basis
of these facts, I would hold that the officers had probable cause
to arrest Leonard when they stopped his vehicle, and that
therefore the trial court properly denied Leonard's motion to
suppress. Accordingly, I agree that Leonard's conviction should
be affirmed.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
In its brief, the State does not contend that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything
more intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions.
Accordingly, the debate on appeal was principally directed to
whether the police officers possessed the articulable suspicion
necessary to justify a level-two encounter. I agree the officers
had the requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two
stop. It does not follow, however, that what the officers
actually effected was a proper level-two stop. Given the
intrusive tactics employed by the investigating officers, I
believe the main opinion errs in determining that the initial
seizure was a level-two stop and not a de facto arrest requiring
probable cause.

900560-CA

16

According to the record, the police officers stopped
defendant because they suspected him of committing a non-violent
felony—possession of equipment used in the manufacture of
controlled substances. There were four police officers present,
and three police cars, while only defendant and his female
companion occupied the stopped vehicle. The stop occurred along
the shoulder of a well-traveled highway, apparently during
daylight.1 At no time prior to the stop had the officers seen
defendant or his companion in possession of a weapon, and the
record provides no indication that the police had anything more
than a pre-stop hunch that defendant might be dangerous. When
defendant's vehicle came to a halt on the shoulder of the
highway, defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and walked
toward the police cars. There is no evidence that defendant made
furtive gestures, carried himself suspiciously, or otherwise
approached the police in anything but a cooperative, non-violent
manner.2
Nonetheless, Officer Fox testified that before questioning
defendant, he ordered defendant to kneel down at the side of the
highway. The female occupant of defendant's vehicle was placed
in one of the police cars. Further, although neither Officer Fox
nor Officer Caldwell recalled specifically whether any of the
police officers drew their guns at the time they made the stop,
Officer Fox claimed it was "very possible" guns were drawn, and
Officer Caldwell stated that he "hoped" at least one of the
officers had drawn his gun. Finally, Officer Fox testified that
before questioning defendant, Officer Caldwell advised defendant
of his Miranda rights.
A Terry stop "involves no more than a brief stop,
interrogation, and, under the proper circumstances, a brief check
for weapons." United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th
1. Although the record does not state the time of the stop,
other facts—i.e., that, just prior to the stop, officers had
been conducting surveillance at a wholesale establishment open
for business, and that officers clearly saw bandannas being waved
from defendant's vehicle—indicate that the stop took place
during daylight hours.
2. It would thus appear that any pre-stop concern the officers
had about the potential dangerousness of defendant would have
been largely dispelled by his non-confrontational approach. Any
lingering concern could have been dispelled by a simple pat down
of the sort permitted by Terry.

900560-CA

17

Cir. 1987). Anything beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is
required. See id.; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99
S. Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979). The accepted rule is that what might
have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a
reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would believe
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 800
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.
Ct. 1580 (1987). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502,
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1983) (characterizing relevant inquiry
as whether the suspect believed he was being detained).
Accordingly, in the course of a valid Terry stop the police may
not, as a matter of routine, utilize methods which might commonly
be employed incident to arrest. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 9.2(d) at 366 (2d ed. 1987).
There is, however, one exception to this general
proscription against intrusive police conduct. Police are
permitted to employ a show of force or other exceptional methods
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers.3
3. For situations in which police officers may draw weapons
while effecting a stop, see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 759
F.2d 633, 638-39 (8th Cir.) (drawing weapons is permissible part
of vehicle stop "if the police action is reasonable under the
circumstances," taking into consideration "the number of officers
and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether
there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the
strength of the officers' articulable, objective suspicions, the
erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under
observation, and the need for immediate action by the
officers . . . . " ) , cert, denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S. Ct. 113
(1985); United States v. Narai. 732 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir.
1984) (display of weapons does not transform stop into arrest
when suspected crime is a serious felony and stop was made in an
isolated area); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1345-46
(9th Cir. 1983) (drawing weapon acceptable when vehicle's
occupant is suspected of bank robbery and is possibly under the
influence of drugs, and the police officer is alone).
For situations in which police officers may require a
suspect to lay down on the ground, see, e.g., United States v.
Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (when suspect ran
toward apartment for which police had a warrant to search for
guns and drugs, and suspect put his hand into his pants, it was
acceptable for police to force suspect to lie on the floor),
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1790 (1990); United States v. Taylor,
(continued...)

However, even then, the investigating officers must employ the
least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the purpose
of the stop. See Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1325 (recognizing that,
although permissible level of intrusion will vary with
circumstances, least intrusive means must always be employed).
I agree that, in the instant case, the State has set forth
sufficient facts to support a finding that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and make a level-two
inquiry. However, given the circumstances of the encounter, I do
not believe those same facts support a finding that the intrusive
methods used by the police were necessary to protect the officers
during the stop.4 The State has provided no additional evidence
to justify the officers' conduct.5 Therefore, on the record
before us, I believe the seizure to have been too intrusive to
qualify as a level-two stop.6
3(...continued)
716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (stop not invalid because
police ordered suspect to lie on the floor, when suspect had
disobeyed police commands to raise his hands and had made furtive
gestures); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 962,
431 N.Y.S.2d 485 (ordering suspect to the floor was permissible
when suspect was in company of man whom there was probable cause
to arrest for an armed robbery that had just been committed, and
police had witnessed a suspicious exchange between that man and
the suspect), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 582 (1980).
4.
The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt
to discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests
that, once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the
officers did not suspect he was armed. Robertson. 833 F.2d at
781. Other circumstances of the stop—the highway-side locale,
the presence of four officers, the non-violent nature of the
suspected offense, and defendant's non-furtive attempt to
approach the police vehicles—also indicate the situation was not
potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics were
inappropriate.
5. The problem may essentially be a failure by the State, at the
trial court, to develop the available evidence so as to meet its
burden of proof. Little attention seems to have been given at
the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in effecting the
stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to effect the stop.
6. Nonetheless, I might still be willing to view the facts as
not moving the case from the level-two to the level-three
pigeonhole if, at the time the seizure occurred, a reasonable,
(continued...)

It is the State's burden to show that the seizure it seeks
to justify was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of
a level-two stop. United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781
(8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rover, 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26). See
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986). For the
reasons discussed above, I believe the State falls short of
satisfying that burden. See also note 4, supra. Accordingly, I
would hold that the district court erred in determining defendant

6(...continued)
innocent person in defendant's place would not have believed
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 800
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.
Ct. 1580 (1987). I find such a possibility unlikely here. The
police converged on defendant in three separate cars. The
initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite defendant's
passivity, and may well have included a show of weapons by one or
more officers. Defendant was ordered to his knees at the side of
the highway, while his female companion was placed in the back of
a police vehicle. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda
rights. It is unlikely that, at this point in the encounter, a
reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his
seizure to be less than a level-three custodial one. Other cases
have reached the same result in similar circumstances. See,
e.g., United States v. Delaadillo-Velasquez. 856 F.2d 1292, 1295
(9th Cir. 1988) (Terry-stop of suspected drug dealers held
invalid when police approached with guns drawn, ordered the
suspects to lie down in the street, and handcuffed them, since
the "show of force and detention used in this context are
indistinguishable from police conduct in an arrest"); Kraus v.
County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (under
circumstances in which police turned spotlights on the suspects,
drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to their
knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself to be
under arrest), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S. Ct/1571
(1987) .

was subjected to a valid level-two stop, reverse the denial of
defendant's suppression motion,7 and remand with instructions to
permit withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

7. The evidence seized from the car and from defendant's home is
tainted by the illegality of his "arrest" on less than probable
cause• Probable cause came into existence only when defendant
made incriminating statements when in custody, but such custody
was improper where it was supported by nothing more than an
articulable suspicion.
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Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Russon.
The court has considered the state's petition for
rehearing.

The opinion issued ruled in favor of the state.

The petition requests that a footnote be deleted.
has no bearing on the result of the opinion.

The footnote

Revision or

deletion of the footnote will not materially affect the result
of this case.
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single footnote in Judge Jackson's opinion.
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member of the panel joined in that opinion.

Three separate
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court."

It follows that granting a rehearing with the limited
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Trial Court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

Case Number

STATE OF UTAH,

88-CR-0042
88-CR-0043

Plaintiff,
RULING

vs.
FOSTER LEONARD and APRIL GARZA,
Defendants.
********

This matter came before the Court on the August 29,
1989 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained
from the arrest of above entitled defendants, and the subsequent
search of defendants1

vehicle and place of residence.

Ragan appeared for the State.
represented by counsel.
Fitt

and

defendant

Sherry

Both defendants were present c id

Defendant Leonard was represented by Jay

Garza

was

represented

by Dean

Witnesses were called and evidence was presented.

Zabriskie.
The Court,

having carefully considered all the evidence enters now its:
RULING
From

approximately

May

1,

1989,

law

enforcement

agencies had been conducting suveillance at Intertech Chemical in
Orem Utah.

The surveillance has resulted in a number of arrests

and convictions.
conducting

On July 20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was

surveillance

at

Intertech.

He

noticed

defendant

Leonard in the parking lot wearing casual clothes and using what

appeared to be a personal vehicle rather than a company vehicle.
Leonard behaved in a nervous manner.

He purchased what looked to

the detective to be glassware and chemicals and appeared to pay
in cash.

Defendants loaded the glassware and chemicals in to the

vehicle and left the parking lot.
Detective Fox decided to follow the vehicle in order to
identify its owner.

As Fox attempted

to follow the vehicle,

another car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent attempt to
disrupt his progress.

It appeared to Fox that the defendants'

vehicle was trying to evade pursuit.

Fox noted reckless behavior

on the part of the defendants as they turned
freeway that nearly caused an accident.

to get on the

On the freeway, the

defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per hour in a 55 miles
per hour zone.
Detective Fox called for back up after a check through
dispatch found no owner registered for either the plates of the
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that swerved in front of
him.

The vehicle was stopped without incident after the backup

arrived.
and

gave

The officers on the scene then arrested the defendants
the

appropriate

Miranda

warnings.

Defendants

were

interviewed separately concerning what they had purchased and the
purpose for which they had purchased it.

They gave the officers

different stories—but both indicated that they were purchasing
the equipment for someone else.

Defendant Leonard at first gave

a false identification and date of birth.
in defendant Garza's purse.

Over $2,000 was found

Prior to the arrest of the defendants and the search of
the vehicle, the officers had made contact with Intertech and
were told what the defendants had purchased.
the

vehicle—including

glassware

and

The items found in

chemicals—matched

description of the merchandise given by Intertech.
contained

items

methamphetamine.
her own.

frequently

used

in

the

the

The vehicle

manufacture

of

Defendant Garza gave two different addresses as

After checking with Mountain Bell, the officers found

that one of the addresses given had a phone listed in her name.
Based upon the information given above, a search warrant was
served

on

Garzafs

defendant

residence.

Numerous

"listed"

chemicals and drug paraphernalia were found.
The Court finds that the stop made by the officers was
appropriate and legal.

Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion

based on the circumstances taken as a whole.
not

appear

to

be ordinary

businessmen;

The defendants did

they

appeared

to be

nervous; they drove erratically; they used what appeared to be a
personal vehicle; another car seemed to be acting in concert with
defendants

in

an

attempt

to

block

the

detective's

pursuit;

dispatch could not identify owner of the the vehicle from the
license plate number; the defendants were traveling more than 15
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit; the list of items
purchased given to the officers while in pursuit were indicative
of illegal activity.

All of these factors taken together could

easily create a reasonable and articulateble suspicion necessary
to make an investigatory stop.

Defendants were properly given their Miranda warnings.
Even before the officers began investigatory questioning which
does not require

it, defendants were given Miranda warnings.

Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1983).
The

Court

believes

vehicle was proper.

the

search

of

defendants1

the

The list of items purchased from Intertech

received while the officers were in pursuit, combined with the
suspicious

behavior

of

the

defendants,

and

all

attendant

circumstances, created probable cause for search of the vehicle.
Even if the search was improper, the illegality would not affect
the legality of the search warrant.

The reasoning of the Court

is that information relative to the evidence found in the vehicle
was available to the officers in the form of a purchase order
from Intertech.
The chemicals and equipment found in the defendants'
vehicle and on the purchase order from Intertech were commonly
used

together

testimony

in

the

indicated

making

that

of

methamphetamine.

the materials

found

In

lacked

fact

only one

specialized piece of glassware and some other chemicals to allow
one to easily make methamphetamine.
rarely

used

in

methamphetamine.

conjunction

to

Also, such equipment is

make

anything

other

than

The officers, being aware of the facts above,

had probable cause to make the arrest.
The Court believes that there was sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant based on the conduct
of the defendants and the purchase order from Intertech.

This

probable cause was enhanced by the statements of the defendants
relative
Intertech

to the

intended

use

of

the supplies

and the false information

obtained

given relative

from

to living

quarters and identity.
For the reasons given above, the Court finds that the
stop of the defendants1 vehicle, the subsequent questioning of
the defendants, and
proper.

Therefore,

the issuance of the search warrant were
the

Court

denies

defendants

motion

suppress.
DATED in Provo, this

/ 9day

of October, 1989.

BY THE COURT

GEORGE BC BALLIF, JUDG

cc:

Dean Zabriskie
Jay Fitt
Sherry Ragan

to

APPENDIX 3
Controlling Constitutional & Statutory Provisions

TEXT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Amendment IV to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Article I,
provides:

Section

14 of the

Constitution

of

Utah

similarly

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990) provides:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes
all of the physical senses or any device that enhances
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense,
or records the observations of any of the physical
senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the
person has committed a public offense, and there is
reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
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